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Abstract
We investigate the impact of CFO gender on CFO compensation and earnings management
in Australia. In a sample of exchange-listed firms from 2006 to 2010, we find a significant
gender pay gap in CFO compensation but much of this pay gap dissipates when female
CFOs are matched using a propensity scoring method. Female CFOs tend to choose less
risky remuneration packages with more cash and less non-cash component, with more salary
and less bonus than their male peers. In addition, female CFOs are more conservative and
deliver higher reporting quality compared to male CFOs. They engage substantially less in
both accruals-based and real-based earnings management than their male counterparts. The
difference in behavior of earnings management and in the selected compensation structures
between male and female CFOs can be possibly explained by the gender-based difference in
personal risk preference.
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1 Introduction
There has been a significant increase in female representation in corporate senior management
teams over the past decades.1 According to the Australian Institute of Company Directors,
the percentage of female directorship on the boards of Top 200 firms listed on the Australian
Securities Exchange (ASX) has increased from 8.3% in 2009 to 20% in 2015.2 It is generally
acknowledged that executive gender plays a significant role in various corporate aspects, such
as, reporting quality, compensation, firm performance, financing and acquisitions (Srinidhi et al.
2011, Lam et al. 2013, Low et al. 2015, Huang & Kisgen 2013). Prior research has generally em-
phasized on the role of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). As a result of a number of high profile
corporate collapses and the enactment of legislation in the US and in Australia, the importance
of Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) in firm management has been crystallized. Section 302 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (US) and Section 295A of the Corporations Act (Australia) require both
CEOs and CFOs being personally responsible for accuracy and completeness of company finan-
cial reports. The result of these changes and the corresponding elevation of the role of CFOs
enable CFOs to be treated as a unique and relatively homogeneous role within the executive
ranks.3
As responses to the greater awareness of executive gender issues and the increasingly important
role of CFOs, researchers are now investigating the influence of CFO gender on compensation
and earnings quality (Gayle et al. 2012, Barua et al. 2010, Ge et al. 2011, Francis et al. 2015).
However, mixed results have been found and those studies have generally focused on the US mar-
ket. For example, Bertrand & Hallock (2001) do not find a gender pay gap for CFOs while Gayle
et al. (2012) find a significant CFO pay difference in salary. Similar, Barua et al. (2010) and Peni
& Vahamaa (2010) find that CFO gender significantly affects discretionary accruals whereas Ge
et al. (2011) do not find evidence to support this relationship. In addition, past research has
mainly concentrated on accruals-based earnings management and ignored the real transactions
1Some European countries have implemented gender quotas to increase the number of female directors on
the board. For example, companies in Norway are required to have at least 40% of company board members
to be women since 2003. A failure to achieve this mandatory quota leads to the company being delisted in the
Norwegian stock exchange. Similarly, Germany passed a law requiring 30% of board seats to be filled by women
by 2016.
2This statistics are from website of the Australian Institute of Company Directors
(http://www.companydirectors.com.au/Director-Resource-Centre/Governance-and-Director-Issues/Board-
Diversity/Statistics).
3There is evidence in the literature that CFOs possess superior information due to their roles in the firm’s
financial policy and financial reporting process (Geiger & North 2006, Jiang et al. 2010). Wang et al. (2012) find
that CFO trades are more informative about future stock returns than CEO trades. Similarly, Wang & Wang
(2014) shows that CFOs trades are predictive of new information in future earnings for firms in a poor information
environment.
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manipulation when examining the impact of CFO gender on earnings quality. In this paper we
investigate whether the CFO gender has a material impact on CFO compensation and earnings
management in Australia. We contribute to the literature by examining both accruals and real
earnings management. We further examine how the risk-averse characteristic of female CFOs
could potentially impact on their choice of compensation structure. To our knowledge, this is
the first work in Australia that investigates the gender role at the CFO level and is an important
step in uncovering pay inequity and earnings management behavior in this defined executive role.
Although there are some similarities between Australia and the US, the differences between the
two countries make it interesting to see if the US findings of the impact of CFO gender on
compensation and earnings management also apply in Australia. Similar features of Australia
and the US include a regulatory framework which requires CFOs to certify company financial
reports and a low proportion but significant increase recently of female CFOs in listed corpora-
tions. Our data shows only 7.37% of Australian listed firms employ female CFOs and the similar
percentage (8%) is observed in the US market (Barua et al. 2010). The number of female CFOs
has, nevertheless, increased significantly in both Australian and US corporations. In our sample,
9.52% of Australian CFOs were women in 2010 versus 2.53% in 2006. This figure for the US
market was 7.5% in 2005 versus 3% in 1994 (Huang & Kisgen 2013).
In spite of some similarities, Australia and the US differ remarkably in some aspects. The first
difference is that female and male CFOs in the US work in firms with similar total assets (Barua
et al. 2010) while Australian female CFOs are employed mostly by much smaller firms. Our
data shows that the median sales of firms with female CFOs is about $64 million dollars which
is approximately 9 times smaller than that in firms employing male CFOs. The board structure
of Australian firms is distinguished from their US counterparts with Australian boards being
smaller, having a lower proportion of executive directors and less likely being chaired by CEOs
(Bugeja, da Silva Rosa, Duong & Izan 2012). In addition, the proportion of Australian CFOs
who are a member of the company board of director is roughly 5 times higher than that reported
in the US market (Duong & Evans 2015). This difference implies that Australian CFOs could
be potentially involved in making more strategic decisions. Another difference between the two
countries is in the structure of CFO compensation. The US CFOs are remunerated heavily to-
wards non-cash component such as shares and options (Balsam et al. 2012) whereas Australian
CFOs receive more cash component (salary and bonus) in their compensation package (Duong
& Evans 2015). The final aspect that distinguish Australia and the US is that the regulation
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on audit committees, which play an important role in constraining earnings management, is
less prescriptive in Australia than that in the US (Wilson 2011). While the audit committees
of all listed US firms are legislated to have solely independent directors, this requirement for
Australian listed firms is to follow the best practice guidelines issued by the ASX.
Our evidence is based on the original sample of 556 firm-year observations of exchange-listed
firms in Australia from 2006 to 2010. We find that female CFOs mainly work for small and
medium enterprises (SMEs) and are concentrated in consumer stables and financial industries.
There are no female CFOs in male-dominated industries, such as, information technologies,
telecommunication and utilities. The majority of firms employ male CFOs with less than 10%
of firms employing female CFOs. Female CFOs choose less risky remuneration packages by
receiving significantly more in cash and less in non-cash components than male CFOs. They
also have higher proportion of salary and lower proportion in bonus to total compensation than
their male CFOs. Female CFOs have similar qualifications compared to their male peers and
the performance of companies is not significantly impacted by the CFO gender. Women CFOs
tend to own more company shares, have shorter tenure and be less likely to have a seat on the
company board of directors compared with their male counterparts. In addition, companies with
female CFOs are smaller in size, have lower leverage and higher percentage of female directors
on the board.
In contrast to the US studies (Bertrand & Hallock 2001, Gayle et al. 2012), it is found that
there is a significant gender pay gap in Australian CFO compensation in our original sample.
The average total compensation of female CFOs is less than half of that paid to their male
counterparts. Furthermore, this pay gap does not decrease when there are female directors on
the company board or on the compensation committee. However, the CFO gender pay gap
dissipates when we replicate the original analysis with a matched sample using a propensity
score matching method. It suggests that the CFO pay disparity could be the size effect as it
is generally recognized that larger firms primarily offer higher remuneration packages to their
executives. Despite having lower pay, female CFOs deliver higher reporting quality compared
to their counterparts. It is found that female CFOs are more conservative in both accruals and
real earnings management policies. Companies with female CFOs have significant lower earn-
ings management than companies with male CFOs, and this result is robust in the propensity
score setting. The gender-based difference in risk attitudes could possibly explain the different
behavior of CFOs towards earnings management and the choice of remuneration packages.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of prior
literature. Section 3 describes the research method, sample and data collection. In section 4
the empirical results, robustness tests and discussion of the findings are presented. The paper
is concluded in Section 5.
2 Literature review
2.1 CFO gender and compensation
During the last two decades, there have been significant positive changes in society’s attitude
to discrimination and equality and yet there has been little change in the gender pay gap over
that period. As reported by the National Centre for Social and Economic Modeling in 2010,4
the gender pay gap, defined by the OECD as the difference between male and female earnings
expressed as a percentage of male earnings, has remained in the narrow 15%-17% range since
1990. It is documented by Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) that the average full-time
weekly earnings of women in Australia in 2012 was 18% less than that of men.5 The gender pay
gap typically widens as women climb the corporate ladder. ABS data in 2012 also showed that
the average weekly total cash earnings of female chief executives and managing directors was
25% less than their male counterparts. There has been ongoing discussion and an abundance of
papers and reports on the question of why there is a gender pay gap. The Government of the
Australian state of Queensland, in a fact sheet6 from the Department of Justice and Attorney
General, listed a number of factors contributing to the gender pay gap. In particular, women
are likely to be paid less because of “poor recognition of qualifications, absence of appropriate
classification structures, absence of previous and detailed assessment of their work and working
in industries that are female dominated” (p.2 of the fact sheet). If we critically review the cited
reasons then no such gender pay gap should exist in executive roles such as CEOs and CFOs
which historically have been male dominated, have a significant accountability and assessment
component, and for public companies the incumbents’ qualifications are on the public record.
It is however widely documented in the literature that there is a gender earnings gap at senior
4The report is from the website of the National Centre for Social and Economic Modeling
(http://www.natsem.canberra.edu.au/publications/); “The impact of a sustained gender wage gap on the Aus-
tralian economy” by R. Cassells, Y. Vidyattama and R. Miranti and J. McNamara, March 2010.
5Data is from the ABS website (http://www.abs.gov.au) under Category 6306.0 Employee Earnings and Hours,
Australia, 2012.
6The fact sheet, titled “Why is there a gender pay gap” in September 2010, is from the website of the
Department of Justice and Attorney General, Queensland (http://www.justice.qld.gov.au).
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management levels (e.g. Bertrand & Hallock 2001, Kulich et al. 2011, Gayle et al. 2012, Lam
et al. 2013). Women in managerial positions typically face a “glass ceiling”, namely, an invisible
barrier that prevents them climbing the corporate ladder (Daily et al. 1999). The obstacles that
women encounter can become more prominent as they progress further in their careers (Powell
1999). As a result, there is only a very small proportion of top-level executive positions occupied
by women. For example, women only account for 1.97% of CEOs in the US over the period
1998-2010 (Bugeja, Matolcsy & Spiropoulos 2012) and 4.4% of Chinese CEOs during the years
between 2000 and 2008 (Lam et al. 2013). When taking a sample of CEOs and CFOs of listed
firms in the US, Huang & Kisgen (2013) find the proportion of female executives is 6.6% for the
years 1993-2005.
The majority of work on director gender pay has looked at all executives as one group and gen-
erally supports the proposition that there is gender bias in executive compensation. Bertrand &
Hallock (2001), using a data set of the five highest-paid executives in each US firm for the years
1992-1997, show that there is a gender difference in executive pay and female executives earn
significantly less than their male counterparts. Munoz-Bullon (2010) finds that male executives
in the US are compensated at significantly higher levels than female executives for the years
1992 to 2006. Similarly, Shin (2012) finds a gender gap in US executive compensation over the
period 1998-2005 and this gap is smaller when there is a representation of women on the board
or remuneration committee. Vieito & Khan (2012) show that executive pay gap persists for
S&P 1500 listed firms during the period from 1992 to 2004. Gayle et al. (2012) also document
a significant gender pay gap of US executives for the period 1991 to 2006. In their sample,
male executives earn on average $80,000 more than female executives in cash-based salary and
$540,000 more in total compensation. Similar to the US studies, Kulich et al. (2011) provide
evidence of gender pay gap in UK corporate boardrooms during the period 1998 to 2004. Their
results indicate that bonuses paid to male executives are larger than that paid to female execu-
tives. In addition, bonuses for male CEOs are more closely linked to performance while women
CEOs are neither rewarded nor punished for performance.
There are numerous studies in the literature that examine the impact of gender on compensa-
tion which focus exclusively on the CEO group. The results on the association between gender
and CEO compensation are mixed. Based only on univariate analyses, Jordan et al. (2007)
document that female CEOs of firms in the Fortune 100 do not earn significantly less than their
male peers. Bugeja, Matolcsy & Spiropoulos (2012), investigating CEO compensation of US
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listed firm between 1998 and 2010, show that the remuneration of female CEOs is equivalent to
their male counterparts. Their results are robust for both the original sample and the matched
sub-sample using the propensity score matching method which identifies a control firm for each
firm employing a female CEO. However, Lam et al. (2013), in a study of Chinese-listed enter-
prises, find that female CEOs receive significantly less compensation than male CEOs and find
no evidence to explain this differential when comparing firm performance. As mentioned earlier,
Bertrand & Hallock (2001) and Gayle et al. (2012) both find a significant gender pay gap when
pooling all executives in one group. However, when they control for the executive rank, their
results on CEO gender pay gap is different. Bertrand & Hallock (2001) find the gender pay gap
is still persistent in the CEO group while Gayle et al. (2012) find there is no pay difference in
the CEO rank.
As previously discussed, the legislative elevation of CFOs to the same level of financial over-
sight responsibility as CEOs has emphasized the important role of CFOs beyond that of other
company executives. It indicates that CFOs should be treated as a homogeneous group within
the executive ranks. There are a number of studies that have been undertaken to examine the
gender pay gap in executive compensation but little work to date has specifically included the
role of CFOs in this discussion. The exception is found in the US studies of Bertrand & Hallock
(2001) and Gayle et al. (2012) who separate the CFO group from other executives and examine
the gender pay gap for different executive ranks. Bertrand & Hallock (2001) do not find the dif-
ference in pay between male and female CFOs whereas Gayle et al. (2012) find a significant CFO
pay difference in salary but not total compensation. However, the CFO group in the study of
Gayle et al. (2012) is “contaminated” as it also contains other company executives such as Vice
President and Chief Operating Officer. Moreover, their analysis of the CFO group is limited to
univariate evidence. In this paper we aim at filling this gap by investigating the impact of gender
on CFO compensation in Australia. We investigate further to see if the compensation structure
of CFOs is different with their gender. Our first research question is to examine whether there
is a significant variance between Australian male and female CFOs in terms of compensation
level and compensation structure.
2.2 CFO gender and earnings management
Although the gender pay gap exists at the senior management team, there is evidence in the
literature that female directors can positively affect financial reporting quality through engaging
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less in earnings management. Carter et al. (2003) show that female directors are more likely
to exercise greater independence than male counterparts. Adams & Ferreira (2009) find that
gender-diverse boards exhibit more diligence and demand greater accountability for managers’
performance. These studies suggest that female directors could improve board oversight and
monitoring and thereby improve earnings quality. Labelle et al. (2010) find that gender diver-
sity in senior management team is positively associated with earnings quality. Similarly, Srinidhi
et al. (2011) document that firms with female directors on the board have higher quality of re-
ported earnings than firms without gender-diverse boards.
The literature on gender-based psychological differences suggests that women and men exhibit
distinct values and interests, and these characteristic differences may also influence their be-
havior in work life (Byrnes et al. 1999, Betz et al. 1989). Women are generally more cautious
and risk-averse than men in making financial decisions (Riley & Chow 1992, Sunden & Surette
1998). Levi et al. (2014) provide evidence that acquiring firms with female CEOs pay signifi-
cantly lower takeover premiums than acquiring firms with male CEOs. Huang & Kisgen (2013)
find that female executives (CEOs and CFOs) are more cautious in evaluating acquisitions and
in issuing debt. As compared to bidding firms with male executives, firms with female execu-
tives achieve higher announcement returns even though they make a significantly less number
of acquisitions. Female executives are also less likely to issue debt and more likely to reduce
the leverage ratio than their male counterparts (Huang & Kisgen 2013). Francis et al. (2015)
further document that female CFOs are more conservative in their financial reporting practices.
Their study strongly supports the assertion that female CFOs are more risk-averse than male
CFOs.
In addition to risk aversion, women tend to be less acrimonious and are more likely to comply
with rules and regulations whereas men are interested in economic benefits and more likely to
break rules to achieve success (Baldry 1987, Betz et al. 1989). Lenney (1977) finds that gender
differences are particularly prevalent in ambiguous situations and in areas that require execu-
tive judgement such as earnings management. Peni & Vahamaa (2010) and Barua et al. (2010)
analyze the association between CFO gender and abnormal accruals for US companies and find
that firms with female CFOs have higher quality of accruals than firms with male CFOs. The
result is likely due to the fact that female executives are more cautious, risk-averse and likely
to act more decisively than their male counterparts in improving earnings quality (Barua et al.
2010, Srinidhi et al. 2011). However, Ge et al. (2011) do not find evidence that CFO gender
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significantly affects discretionary accruals among US firms.
There are two main types of earnings management practices: accruals management (AM) and
real transactions management (RTM). AM depicts choices managers make to attain earnings
objectives through the selection of generally accepted accounting methods and discretionary
estimates of accruals. In contrast to AM, RTM describes activities where managers try to meet
earnings objectives by changing the timing or structuring of an operating, investing or financing
decision (Badertscher 2011). It is shown in the literature that firms may switch between the AM
and RTM methods (Graham et al. 2005, Roychowdhury 2006, Cohen et al. 2008, Badertscher
2011). Badertscher (2011) argues that accruals management would be a popular choice for
managers because it has no first-order effect on cash flows and is therefore less likely to de-
stroy long-term value. In contrast, real transactions manipulation harms future cash flows, has
adverse impact on optimal business operations and potentially damages long-term firm value
(Roychowdhury 2006, Cohen et al. 2008). The literature about the impact of female CFOs on
earnings management concentrates mainly on accruals-based management (Peni & Vahamaa
2010, Barua et al. 2010, Ge et al. 2011). To the best of our knowledge, there is no current study
that examines the influence of female CFOs on the real-based earnings management choice.
Although CFOs are primarily responsible for reporting company financial results, the majority
of Australian research focuses on examining the role of CEOs on earnings quality (Wilson 2011).
Jiang et al. (2010) find CFOs have more influence on earnings management than CEOs, sug-
gesting that the impact of CFOs on earnings quality should be more thoroughly investigated.
As discussed previously, the importance of CFOs has significantly increased with the demand
for reliable and accurate financial information. Legislation has elevated the role of CFOs and
made both CEOs and CFOs responsible for the accuracy and completeness of company financial
reports. There is limited evidence about the effect of CFO gender on earnings management in
Australia and the results in the US market are mixed. Our second research question is to exam-
ine whether CFO gender influences earnings quality in the Australian market. It is hypothesized
that female CFOs would engage in less earnings management practices since they tend to be
more conservative compared to their male peers.
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3 Data and methodology
3.1 Research method - CFO compensation level and structure
The following model is estimated to investigate our first research question, namely, whether
CFO gender has an impact on the level and the structure of CFO compensation:
CFOCompensation = α+ β(FemaleCFOs) + δk(CFOCharacteristics)+
+ θm(GovernanceCharacteristics) + λn(FinancialCharacteristics)
+ [Y earDummies] + [IndustryDummies] + ǫ
(1)
The dependent variable in equation (1) is the compensation paid to CFOs during the year or the
structure of their compensation. For the level of CFO compensation, we examine four measures:
annual bonus, annual salary, total annual non-cash compensation (the sum of restricted stock
rewards and stock option awards granted to CFOs), and total annual compensation (the sum
of total cash and non-cash compensation). For the structure of CFO compensation, we calcu-
late the proportion of salary, bonus, cash and non-cash compensation to their total compensation
The variable of interest, Female CFOs, is a binary variable equal to 1 if the company CFO is
female. If there is a gender pay gap at CFO level, it is expected that the coefficient of Female
CFOs variable is significantly negative. The remaining independent variables in model (1) are
from the prior literature in executive compensation and provide controls for CFO, governance
and company financial characteristics. Our first control for CFO characteristics is a binary vari-
able equal to 1 if the CFO has an MBA degree (MBA Qualification). The second measure of
CFO characteristics is the number of years in service of the current CFO (CFO Tenure). We
also include the percentage of company shares owned by the CFO (CFO Ownership) as our
next control variable. The last control is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CFO is a mem-
ber of the company board of directors (CFO Board). It is reasonable to expect that firms will
compensate more for CFOs with higher qualification. Banghoj et al. (2010) shows that there
is a significantly positive relationship between compensation paid to executives and their level
of education in Danish private firms. CFOs that have a longer tenure with the firm, or have
greater equity ownership, or have a seat on the board of directors are expected to exert greater
influence over the board on setting their remuneration (Bedard et al. 2014, Duong & Evans 2015).
For corporate governance, we control for the presence of female directors on the board or on
the remuneration committee. Shin (2012), based on the social identity theory of Hogg & Terry
(2000), suggests that female directors would evaluate female executives more favorably than
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they would evaluate male executives. He finds that the gender pay gap in executive compen-
sation is smaller when there is a greater proportion of female directors on the board or on the
compensation committee. Based on the findings of Shin (2012), we include the percentage of
female directors on the board or on the remuneration committee7 in the regression (1). In
addition, the interaction variable between the presence of female directors on the board (or
the compensation committee) and the Female CFOs dummy variable is also included in the
model (1). We also control for differing structures of the company board of directors. The
number of directors on the board (Board Size) and the percentage of executive directors on the
board (Insider Ratio) are used as measures of board governance characteristics. As evidenced
in Rosenstein & Wyatt (1990) and Yermack (1996), smaller boards and boards with higher pro-
portions of outside directors are more effective and may act to constrain executive compensation.
Consistent with prior work on executive compensation (e.g. Murphy 1985, Smith & Watts 1992,
Bedard et al. 2014, Ferreira et al. 2013), we include sales, firm leverage, growth opportunity
and firm performance as financial control variables. We use Sales as measured by the natural
logarithm of company sales in the previous year to control for size. Firm leverage is calculated
as total debt divided by the market value of equity in the previous year. The firm growth op-
portunity is captured by the market-to-book equity ratio (M/B ratio), and is winsorized at the
1st and 99th percentiles in order to control for outliers in the data. Finally, firm performance is
controlled for by using both accounting and market performance measures. The market mea-
sure chosen is the company’s annual common stock return (Stock Returns) and the selected
accounting measure is return on assets (ROA). The evidence presented in the literature gen-
erally concludes that executive compensation is higher for companies with larger size, greater
investment/growth opportunities, and better firm performance.
3.2 Research method - Earnings management
To investigate the second research question on the impact of CFO gender on earnings manage-
ment, the following model is firstly estimated:
EarningsManagement = α+ β(FemaleCFOs) + δk(CFOCharacteristics)k
+ θm(GovernanceCharacteristics)m + λn(FinancialCharacteristics)n
+ [Y earDummies] + [IndustryDummies] + ǫ
(2)
The dependent variable of model (2) can be measures of accruals management (AM) or real
7These two variables are included alternatively in the model (1) due to their high degree of correlation.
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transactions management (RTM). To proxy for accruals management, we estimate the accrual
estimation errors using the model of Dechow & Dichev (2002). The AM measure is computed
as the absolute value of residuals from equation (3) below:
∆WCt = β0 + β1(CF )t + β2(CF )t−1 + β3(CF )t+1 + ǫ (3)
In equation (3), ∆WCt represents the changes in working capital from year t-1 and year t and
is calculated as the difference between the changes in current assets and the changes in current
liabilities. ∆WCt = (∆CAt - ∆Casht) - (∆CLt - ∆STDebtt). Cash and short-term debt are
excluded because they do not represent operating accruals. All variables in equation (3) are
scaled by average total assets. Dechow & Dichev (2002) define accruals quality in terms of the
extent to which current accruals is associated with current, previous and subsequent year cash
flows. Therefore, the residuals from the equation (3) measure (inverse) discretionary accruals
quality. A high value of the accrual estimation errors implies poor accruals quality and firms
are likely to engage in accruals management.
To proxy for RTM, we follow the method of Roychowdhury (2006) who investigates the alter-
ation in real activities by examining the manipulation of cash flows from operations (CF), dis-
cretionary expenditures8 and production costs.9 As data on cost of goods sold and discretionary
expenses are not available on DatAnalysis database for Australian companies,10 we adopt the
methodology of Duong & Evans (2015) by investigating the manipulation of real activities on
CF and capital expenditures (CAPEX) since firms can reduce reported expenses and increase
earnings by reporting higher amount of capital expenditures.11 Following Roychowdhury (2006)
and Duong & Evans (2015), the normal level of CF and CAPEX are estimated for each industry
and year using the following equations:
CFt/TAt−1 = α0 + α1(1/TAt−1) + α2(Salest/TAt−1) + α3(∆Salest/TAt−1) + ǫt (4)
CAPEXt/TAt−1 = α0 + α1(1/TAt−1) + α2(Salest−1/TAt−1) + ǫt (5)
8Discretionary expenditures are calculated as the sum of R&D, advertising, general and administrative (SG&A)
expenses.
9Production costs are computed as the sum of cost of goods sold (COGS) and change in inventory.
10DatAnalysis do not report figures on COGS, R&D expenses and advertising expenses separately for Australian
companies.
11Under Australian income tax law (Section 40-880 of Income Tax Assessment Act 1997), companies which
incur business capital expenditure for a project at its preliminary stage can either (1) capitalize the incurred
expenditure and deduct it over a period of 5 income years, or (2) deduct the capital expenditure in the income
year in which it is incurred. Therefore, capital expenditures can potentially affect the current period expenses
and earnings.
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where TAt−1 is total assets at time t-1, ∆Salest = Salest - Salest−1
The residuals from the regressions (4) and (5) measure the abnormal CF and abnormal CAPEX,
respectively. Consistent with recent research by Zang (2012) and Duong & Evans (2015), the
abnormal CF and abnormal CAPEX are aggregated into one measure, RTM, in order to capture
the total effect of altering real activities. The higher absolute value of RTM suggests that firms
have a greater use of real transactions to manage earnings.
Our independent variables in model (2) are similar to those used in model (1). It is expected
that Female CFOs variable is negatively associated with all inverse measures of earnings quality
as firms with female CFOs would be more likely to have higher earnings quality (Barua et al.
2010). These earnings quality models control for some of CFO characteristics (CFO Board,
CFO Ownership and CFO Tenure) that proxy for CFO power. Powerful CFOs will have greater
ability to manage earnings and therefore we expect a positive relationship (Srinidhi et al. 2011,
Duong & Evans 2015). We also control for corporate governance factors such as the presence of
female directors on the board or on the remuneration committee (Female Dir. Board or Female
Dir. Remu.), the size of audit committee (AC Size) and the proportion of audit committee
members that have accounting financial expertise (PAFE). We expect negative signs on these
corporate governance factors (Srinidhi et al. 2011, Dhaliwal et al. 2010). In addition, there are
a number of company financial characteristics included in model (2) as control variables. We
expect a negative coefficient for firm size as management in larger firms face more pressure to
report predictable earnings (Kothari et al. 2005). Firm leverage and M/B ratio are predicted to
have positive signs (Dechow & Dichev 2002, Menon & Williams 2004). To control for volatility,
we include the proportion of reporting loss over the last 6 years (% Loss), standard deviation
of sales (Std dev (Sales/TA)) and cash flow from operations (Std dev (CF/TA)). We predict a
positive association between volatility and earnigs quality (Dechow & Dichev 2002, Bedard et al.
2014).
In models (1) and (2), we also control for industry and time fixed effects due to the differences
in CFO compensation and earnings management across industries12 and over time. Following
Petersen (2009), we estimate the standard errors of the coefficients using clustered standard
errors as this method better accounts for the dependence in a panel data set (Rogers 1993).
12Firms are sorted according to their 2-digit Global Industry Classification System (GICS) codes.
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3.3 Sample and data
Our data is extracted from the Top 500 firms by market capitalization listed on the ASX between
2006 and 2010. Data on CFO compensation, CFO characteristics and corporate governance for
each company are taken from the S&P Capital IQ database. Where the information in the
S&P Capital IQ database is not available, we extract the data from the firm’s annual report.
Company financial data are obtained from Aspect FinAnalysis database. We exclude from the
sample all companies with a change in CFO in any year and any observations with missing
data. Our final sample consists of 556 firm-year observations. Table 1 provides a summary of
definitions of the variables used in the study together with the data sources.
[Insert Table 1]
Table 2 shows the frequency of firms with female CFOs classified by industry. It is clear that
the majority of firms employ male CFOs. In an era where the majority of graduates from Aus-
tralian business schools is female,13 the number of female CFOs remain low with only 7.37%
of our sample companies employing female CFOs. Female CFOs are concentrated in consumer
staples and financial industries and there is no representation of female CFOs in male-dominated




Table 3 presents descriptive data on the total pooled sample as well as the two sub-samples
partitioned by CFO gender. Panel A of Table 3 shows all variables used in the analysis of
CFO compensation, while Panel B presents additional variables needed for examining earnings
management. It is clear from Panel A of Table 3 that female CFOs are paid significantly less
than their male counterparts in all types of compensation for the years 2006-2010. The average
amount of salary paid to female CFOs is 34% less than what male CFOs earn. The average
total remuneration of female CFOs is $566,428 which is less than a half of the average of $1.2
million in remuneration for male CFOs. For the bonus component, the difference between pay
of men and women is far greater: female CFOs on average receive $75,908 which equates to only
a quarter of the bonus paid to their male peers ($300,575). The story of male CFOs earning
13The average percentage of Australian female graduates in the field of management and commerce course
between 2010 and 2012 is 52%. Data is obtained from Department of Education (Australian Government),
Higher Education Statistics Data Cube (uCube).
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more than female CFOs is also reported in a December 2012 study published by the Australian
Financial Review newspaper.14 In this survey, it is shown that the average remuneration of the
10 highest paid male CFOs is $4.39 million which is more than three times of the average $1.37
million paid for female CFOs.
[Insert Table 3]
In terms of compensation structure, female CFOs get paid significantly more in cash and less in
non-cash components compared to male CFOs.15 We find that the mean and median differences
of the proportion of cash-based and equity-based compensation between male and female CFOs
are both statistically significant. While female CFOs receive 87% of their total compensation
in cash and the remaining 13% in non-cash component, the figures for male CFOs are 83%
and 16%, respectively. Within the cash compensation, female CFOs have a significantly larger
proportion of salary and a smaller percentage of bonuses than that of their male counterparts.
The salary paid to female CFOs accounts for 65% of their total compensation and their bonus
component contributes a further 12%. For male CFOs, the percentage of salary to their total
compensation is only 57% but the proportion of their bonus component makes up 18%. The
difference in compensation structure suggests that female CFOs may be less risk-taking than
male CFOs. This assertion is consistent with previous findings in the literature that women are
relatively more risk averse than men (Sunden & Surette 1998, Agnew et al. 2003).
Panel B of Table 3 displays descriptive statistics of all three measures of earnings management
(AM for accruals management and RTM for real transactions management) when the sample
is separated by CFO gender. The mean and median of both measures are lower for firms with
female CFOs compared with firms having male CFOs. Univariate tests of differences show that
the median of AM is significantly lower while the average figure of RTM is significantly smaller
for firms with female CFOs. Panel B provides preliminarily evidence that earnings quality is
higher for firms with female CFOs.
Table 3 also describes the financial and governance characteristics of firms divided by the CFO
gender. There is no significant difference in M/B ratio, ROA, stock returns, volatility in sales
and cash flow between firms with male or female CFOs. However, the proportion of loss years
14“Top CFOs’ pay rises 10pc” by S. Durummond and E. Tadros, Australian Financial Review newspaper, 10
December 2012.
15Overall, Australian CFOs receive an average annual total compensation of $1.16 million during the period
2006-2010 with more than 84% of their total compensation in cash and approximately 15% in non-cash component.
This is similar to the compensation structure paid to Australian CEOs whose remuneration is weighted heavily
towards the cash component (Chalmers et al. 2006, Bugeja, da Silva Rosa, Duong & Izan 2012).
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over the preceding 6-year period is significantly higher for the sample with female CEOs. In
addition, firms with female CFOs are significantly smaller in size and have lower leverage. Our
finding of lower leverage in firms with female CFOs is consistent with the work of Huang &
Kisgen (2013) who found that male executives issue debt more often than female executives.
Their finding may suggest that male CFOs exhibit relative overconfidence in significant corpo-
rate decision making compared with women CFOs.
In total, 21% of CFOs have an MBA degree and there is no significant difference across the
gender of CFOs.16 Female CFOs own significantly more company shares, have shorter tenure
and are less likely to have a seat on the board of directors when compared with male CFOs.
Firms with female CFOs have a significant higher proportion of female directors on the board
than firms with male CFOs. However, the percentage of female directors on the remuneration
committee is not different by CFO gender. Consistent with the firm size effect, firms with a
female CFO have a significantly smaller board size and audit committee size and more inside
directors on the board. The proportion of audit committee members that have accounting fi-
nancial expertise is higher for firm with female CFOs, but this difference is not statistically
significant.
4.2 Multivariate analysis
The previous section shows the univariate analysis of the difference of CFO compensation and
earnings management in firms with female and male CFOs. In this section, the multivariate
models (1) and (2) are estimated to control for factors other than the gender effect that may
influence CFO compensation and earnings quality respectively.
4.2.1 CFO compensation
As a number of firms do not pay bonuses or offer an equity component, that is, there are zero
values in bonus and total non-cash compensation, we separate CFO compensation into two sub-
samples for the regression analysis. The first sub-group is compensation figures using dollar
value (full sample) and the second sub-group is compensation figures measured in logarithmic
16In the pooled sample, 73% of CFOs have either CA or CPA qualification and no gender difference is observed.
We do not add the CA/CPA qualification variable in our model (1) and (2) as it is an insignificant variable
in the regression analysis. The insignificant result of CPA variable is also observed in a study of Loyeung
& Matolcsy (2015) when they examine Australian CFO compensation in the transition year to International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).
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scale (sample without zero-value compensation).
Table 4 presents the regression results when compensation data is expressed in dollar value. In
Panel A of Table 4, we show the tobit regression results of bonus and total non-cash compensa-
tion since this group contains a number of zero-value observations. The ordinary least squares
(OLS) results of salary and total compensation are presented in Panel B. As can be seen from the
two panels of Table 4, the coefficient on the experimental variable, Female CFOs, is significantly
negative in all models. This indicates that there is a significant gender pay gap and male CFOs
receive higher compensation than their female counterparts. This finding is consistent with the
univariate evidence reported in Table 3 and with previous studies on executive gender pay gap
(Kulich et al. 2011, Shin 2012, Lam et al. 2013).
[Insert Table 4]
The coefficients for the proportion of female directors on the board (% Female Board) and on
the remuneration committee (% Female Remu.) variables are both significantly positive. It sug-
gests that CFOs, in general, receive more compensation when there is a greater representation
of women on the board or on the remuneration committee. However, the gender pay gap in
CFO compensation is not significantly reduced when there is a presence of female directors on
the board or on the compensation committee. The interaction term between the female indi-
cator variable, CFO Female, and the presence of women on the board (or on the compensation
committee) is statistically insignificant. This finding is consistent with the work of Lam et al.
(2013) in their investigation of CEO compensation in Chinese companies. They find the partici-
pation of women on the company board of directors does not increase female CEO remuneration.
The results for control variables are generally consistent with previous studies in the literature.
CFOs with an MBA degree receive significantly more in bonus and total non-cash compensation,
suggesting that CFOs are paid for their talent and efforts. CFOs who are board members earn
more in salary, indicating that CFOs use their power to extract greater pay and this is consistent
with the finding in Duong & Evans (2015). As expected, larger firms and those with the greater
number of directors on the board pay CFOs more in all types of compensation. Firms with
higher growth potential (as measured by the market-to-book ratio) reward their CFOs more in
the non-cash component. This finding may suggest that high growth opportunity firms have
less liquidity relative to lower growth opportunity firms and are more inclined to use shares to
compensate their CFOs. The Stock Returns variable is found to be significantly positive in bonus
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and non-cash compensation. Our finding of a positive association between CFO compensation
and stock performance measure is also evident in previous studies (Balsam et al. 2012, Hoitash
et al. 2012, Bedard et al. 2014, Duong & Evans 2015).
The analysis presented in Table 4 contains a number of variables that are right skewed (all CFO
compensation and CFO Ownership variables (see statistics in Table 3). To mitigate the prob-
lem, we conduct an additional test and transform the variables using logarithmic scales. Table
5 presents the results of the analysis of the transformed variables. The results in Table 5 are
similar to those in Table 4 with a significantly negative association between the CFO Female
variable and all types of CFO compensation. The gender disparity in CFO compensation is
persistent when using transformed variables. Women who rise through the “glass ceiling” to the
level of CFO are still remunerated lower than their male counterparts. In addition, this pay gap
does not narrow when there is a higher percentage of female directors on the board or on the
compensation committee.
[Insert Table 5]
Our univariate evidence shows that there is no difference in corporate performance between firms
employing female and male CFOs (see Table 3). However, it is found in the UK that the pay-for-
performance sensitivity is higher for male executives than female executives (Kulich et al. 2011).
To examine this relationship for CFOs at the multivariate level, we then introduce into the
model (1) two interaction variables between Female CFO variable and both the accounting and
stock performance measures (ROA and Stock Returns). These interaction variables are found
to be insignificant and the remaining results are unchanged from those previously reported in
Table 4 and 5 for the original sample.
In Table 4 and Table 5, the coefficient of the CFO Board variable is significantly positive for
salary compensation. It implies that CFOs who sit on the board are rewarded higher salary
compensation due to having more responsibilities (Duong & Evans 2015). To exclude the addi-
tional impact of CFO board membership on their compensation, we separate the original sample
into two sub-samples: the first sub-sample contains 249 observations in which the CFO has a
seat on the board and the second sub-sample consists of 307 observations in which the CFO is
not a board insider. The proportion of female CFOs is 5.22% in the first sub-sample and 9.12%
in the second sub-sample. We then replicate Table 4 and Table 5 for the two sub-samples sep-
arately. The untabulated results show that the Female CFOs variable is significantly negative
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in all types of compensation and it is consistently observed for both sub-samples. For example,
female CFOs receive approximately $1 million (or $380,000) less in total compensation than
that of male CFOs in the first (or second) sub-sample. This indicates that our finding of the
CFO gender pay gap is unchanged when controlling for the effect of CFO board membership on
compensation.
4.2.2 CFO compensation structure
Table 6 displays the multivariate regression results for the structure of CFO compensation. The
tobit regression results of the proportion of bonus and the proportion of non-cash to total com-
pensation are presented in Panel A of Table 6 as they have zero-value observations. The OLS
results of the proportion of salary and the proportion of cash component to total compensation
are shown in Panel B of Table 6. It can be seen from Table 6, the coefficient of Female CFOs
variable is significantly negative under the Prop. Bonus and Prop. Non-cash categories while
it is significantly positive under the Prop. Salary and Prop. Cash components. Female CFOs
receive lower proportion in bonus and non-cash compensation, but have higher proportion in
salary and cash compensation. This is consistent with the univariate result presented in Table
3 that female CFOs choose to have less-risky remuneration packages. It may be due to the fact
that women are generally more risk averse than men (Sunden & Surette 1998, Agnew et al.
2003).
[Insert Table 6]
Similar to the case of CFO compensation that is expressed in natural logarithm (Table 5), the
percentage of female directors on the board (% Female Board) and on the remuneration commit-
tee (% Female Remu.) variables are all significantly positive for the proportion of CFO non-cash
compensation. It indicates that CFOs receive higher proportion in their non-cash component
when there is women representation on the board or on the remuneration committee. We also
find that CFOs who stay longer in their position are paid significantly higher proportion in cash.
Similarly, CFOs of firms with bigger size of the board or with more executive directors on the
board receive higher percentage of their compensation in salary and total cash. Larger firms
pay their CFOs higher proportion in bonus and non-cash, but less proportion in salary and cash
compensation. As expected, CFOs of firms with high M/B ratio got a greater percentage of
their remuneration in non-cash component. In addition, we find a positive relationship between
the structure of CFO compensation and firm performance. The Stock Returns variable is signif-
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icantly positive for the proportion of bonus, while the ROA variable is significantly positive for
the proportion of salary and total cash compensation.
4.2.3 Earnings management
Table 7 shows the results of model (2) which tests the association of CFO gender and earnings
quality. The first two columns in Table 7 display the results of accruals management (AM) and
the last two columns exhibit the results of real transactions management (RTM).
[Insert Table 7]
It is clear from Table 7 that the coefficients of Female CFOs variable are significantly negative
for all measures of earnings management. It indicates that firms with female CFOs engage
significantly less in accruals-based earnings management and real activities manipulation. The
result of accruals management is similar to the US evidence (Peni & Vahamaa 2010, Barua
et al. 2010). Consistent with the literature on gender-based differences, our results show that
female CFOs are more conservative and firms with female CFOs use significantly less earnings
management relative to firms with male CFOs. Our finding provides supporting evidence that
female CFOs delivery higher quality of earnings than their male counterparts.
Our coefficient estimates for the control variables in Table 7 are in line with prior studies. For
example, the coefficients of Total Assets and Female Dir. Board variables are significantly neg-
ative for AM and are consistent with Kothari et al. (2005) and Srinidhi et al. (2011). Smaller
firms or firms with female board participation are more likely to have higher accruals quality.
The CFO Ownership variable is positive and statistically significant across both measures of
earnings management, implying that the higher the CFO stock ownership, the more likely firms
engage in all types of earnings management. The Std dev (Sales/TA) is significantly negative
with the RTM measure, indicating that firms with higher volatility in sales are less likely to
involve in real transactions manipulation.
4.2.4 Robustness test: matched firms using the propensity matching score method
Given the large disparity in the number of firms with male and female CFOs, we conduct an
additional analysis using the propensity-score matching approach adopted by Armstrong et al.
(2010). This approach also addresses the potential selection bias of female CFOs not being
randomly assigned to firms. The probability of a firm having a female CFO is modeled using
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a logistic regression with both firm size (Sales) and firm leverage as the independent variables.
We include these two variable as the results Table 3 shows that there is a difference of financial
characteristics across the gender of CFOs in firm size and firm leverage. Industry and year
effects are also controlled for in the logit regression. We then use the propensity scores obtained
from the logistic regression and perform a one-to-one nearest neighbor match with replacement.
This procedure is to ensure that each female CFO firm is paired with a male CFO firm in the
same industry and year with the lowest difference in propensity scores. The caplier distance of
0.10 is imposed when we do the match, i.e. the control and treatment firms’ propensity scores
are allowed to differ by up to 0.10. We pool the treatment sample (female CFOs) and the
matched sample (male CFOs) together and have 82 observations for compensation sample and
62 observations for earnings management sample.
It is found that there is no significant difference in firm size and leverage, by construction, be-
tween firms with female and male CFOs in the matched samples. Furthermore, the significant
differences between male and female CFOs for MBA Qualification, Board Size and Insider Ratio
variables in the original sample are no longer apparent in the matched sample. The similar-
ity of control variables across gender indicates that the propensity score matching procedure
has been successful in matching firms with male and female CFOs across multiple dimensions
(Rosenbaum & Rubin 1985). In addition, Sianesi (2004) suggests another method to assess the
matching quality is to re-estimate the probit regression for propensity matching on the matched
sample. The pseudo-R2 and F-test on the joint significance of all regressors before and after
matching are then compared. After the matching there should be no systematic differences in
the distributions of the covariates and the pseudo-R2 should be low. In our case, the pseudo-R2
changes from approximately 10% before the matching procedure to 1% after the match. In
addition, the regression F-test which is not rejected before the matching is rejected after the
match.17 This further indicates that our propensity matching procedure is successful in match-
ing male and female CFOs.
We replicate the regressions of Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7 using the propensity score matched samples.
It is found that the coefficients of the Female CFOs variable in Table 4 and 5 are still negative,
but insignificant in all measures of compensation. It indicates that female CFOs still earn less
than male CFOs in the matched sample, but the difference is not statistically significant at
the conventional levels. However, if looking at the magnitude of the coefficients, it is arguable
17The p-value of the F-test is 0.0048 for the original sample while its value becomes 0.9998 for the matched
sample.
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that the coefficients of the Female CFOs variable are economically large. For example, in the
matched sample, female CFOs receive approximately $100,000 less in bonus, $55,000 less in
salary and $160,000 less in total compensation than their male peers. The results for Table
6 and 7 with the matched sample are unchanged. Female CFOs are more cautious and they
choose to have less-risky compensation packages with more salary, less bonus and less non-cash
component compared to their male counterparts. They also less engage in all types of earnings
management than male CFOs.
4.3 Discussion of results
Our empirical analysis shows that female CFOs only account for a small proportion (7.37%) of
firms in our sample and they generally work in small firms. This is vastly different from the US
where female and male CFOs work in firms of similar size (Barua et al. 2010). It is possible that
gender discrimination explains, at least partially, the small fraction of women compared to men
who become CFOs in the Australian exchange-listed firms. Consistent with the documented
gender pay gap internationally, it is also found that there is a gender disparity in Australian
CFO compensation. Overall, female CFOs earn significantly less than their male counterparts
in all types of remuneration even though they have obtained similar qualifications. In addition,
the company accounting and stock market performance are not significantly impacted by CFO
gender. Although female CFOs earn much less than their male counterparts, our results show
that female CFOs are more conservative and delivery better reporting quality. Compared to
firms with male CFOs, firms with female CFOs have significant lower accruals-based earnings
managemen and real activities manipulation.
The result of no gender pay gap in the propensity score setting suggests that the gender dif-
ferences in CFO pay is possibly due to the firm size effect as larger firms tend to reward their
executives more than smaller firms (Smith & Watts 1992, Bedard et al. 2014, Duong & Evans
2015). Women may choose to work in smaller firms for other reasons. It is often believed that
social and family pressures may exert influence in limiting the workforce mobility of women.
Lam & Dreher (2004) argue that an executive gender pay gap may not be so much an issue
of labor market discrimination but rather family pressures that limit women’s work choices.
Women may only consider high-level positions when they are able to match the work commit-
ment with family life. This may result in a female executive intentionally sacrificing personal
salary enhancement in favor of family convenience (Lam et al. 2013). Similarly, Gayle et al.
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(2012) claim that the higher exit rate for female executives could be another factor in explaining
the executive gender pay gap. Although female executives are most commonly beyond child-
bearing age, there is evidence that such women are more likely to exit the firm for personal or
family-related reasons than their male peers (Sicherman 1996).
Our results also show that female CFOs choose less risky compensation packages than their male
counterparts. We find that female CFOs are compensated more by cash and less by non-cash
component. In addition, female CFOs receive more salary and fewer bonuses, as a proportion
to total compensation, compared to male CFOs. Graham et al. (2013) observe that managers
choose the compensation package according to their personal risk preference. Agency theory
predicts a fundamental trade-off between risk and incentives. From an optimal contract per-
spective, the amount of risk that executives bear and their expected wage payment depends on
their risk attitudes (Grossman & Hart 1983). Risk-taking managers are, consequently, much
more likely to be paid with proportionately more stocks, options, bonuses and much less likely
to be compensated via salary. As risk aversion is an inherent trait of female CFOs, this explains
why female CFOs tend to have less equity-based compensation contracts.
Beside compensation structures, the gender-based difference in risk attitudes could potentially
play a role in justifying the different behavior of CFOs towards earnings management. We find
firms with female CFOs report significantly lower accruals-based and real-based earnings man-
agement. It suggests that female CFOs are more cautious in the real activities manipulation due
to its potential damages to the long-run firm value. Our finding is consistent with a recent study
of Francis et al. (2015) that risk aversion of female CFOs could impact accounting conservatism
and female CFOs adopt more conservative accounting practices than their male counterparts.
5 Conclusion
Increasing business complexity and recent economic shocks have acted to elevate the importance
and significance of the role of CFOs in organizations. It is therefore essential to further explore
and investigate attributes, characteristics and skill sets of CFOs. The primary objective of this
paper is to focus in on one such characteristic, namely CFO gender, and examine how it affects
CFO remuneration and earnings quality.
The results in our paper indicate a gender pay disparity between male and female CFOs. Fe-
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male CFOs are not only paid less than male CFOs but are also totally unrepresented in a large
number of industry groupings. In an era where the majority of graduates from Australian Busi-
ness Schools are female, these findings raise a number of questions. Our findings articulate
the very strong preponderance of female CFOs in small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and
this explains why the CFO gender pay gap dissipates in the propensity score matching method.
We also show that firms with female CFOs incur less debt than those firms with male CFOs
but other characteristics, such as, M/B ratio, company performance and qualifications held by
female CFOs are similar to those of male CFOs. One inference of this is that we are able to
eliminate two possible reasons for female pay inequity, namely, qualification differentials and
differing company performance levels.
Our findings also provide some insights into different pay components between male and fe-
male CFOs. Female CFOs receive a larger proportion of their pay in cash, have smaller bonus
payments and are highly represented in the consumer stables and finance industry groupings.
Although female CFOs receive lower remuneration compared to male CFOs, they add value to
corporations by having higher reporting quality. We find that female CFOs are more conserva-
tive in both accruals-based and real-based earnings management. Due likely to the risk attitudes
of females, there is a gender effect in CFO compensation and earnings quality.
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Table 1: Variable definitions.
Variables Definition
CFO compensation [Data source: Capital IQ database]
Salary The sum of salary and superannuation paid to the CFO during the year.
Bonus Bonus paid to the CFO in the year.
Total Cash Comp. The sum of salary, bonus and other cash compensation paid to the CFO.
Total Non-cash Comp. Total value of restricted stock rewards and stock options awards granted to the CFO
as part of their remuneration package.
Total Comp. Total compensation, calculated as the sum of cash and non-cash component.
CFO compensation structure
Prop. Salary The proportion of CFO salary to their total compensation.
Prop. Bonus The proportion of CFO bonus to their total compensation.
Prop. Cash The proportion of CFO cash compensation to their total compensation.
Prop. Non-cash The proportion of CFO non-cash compensation to their total compensation.
Earnings management [Data source: FinAnalysis database]
AM The amount of accruals management, which is proxied by accrual estimator errors. It
is calculated as the absolute value of residuals using the method of
Dechow & Dichev (2002).
RTM The amount of real transactions management, which is the sum of the absolute value
of abnormal operating cash flows and abnormal capital expenditures using the
method of Zang (2012).
Financial characteristics [Data source: FinAnalysis database]
Sales Natural logarithm of gross sales figure after credit and returns in prior year.
Leverage The firm financial leverage, calculated as total debt divided by market value of
equity in the previous year.
M/B Ratio The market value of equity divided by the book value of equity.
ROA Earnings before tax divided by total assets in the prior year.
Stock Returns The unadjusted return on company’s shares during the year, calculated as the current
year share price divided by the previous share price, expressed in logarithm.
Total Assets Natural logarithm of total assets in prior year.
Prop. Loss Years The proportion of years that a company made loss over the previous 6 years.
Std dev (Sales/TA) Standard deviation of sales divided by total assets over the previous 5 years.
Std dev (CF/TA) Standard deviation of operating cash flows divided by total assets over the last 5 years.
Governance and CFO characteristics [Data source: Capital IQ, FinAnalysis database & annual reports]
Female CFOs An indicator variable coded as one if the CFO of company is female, zero otherwise.
MBA Qualification An indicator variable coded as one if the company CFO has an MBA degree, zero
otherwise.
CFO Board An indicator variable coded as one if the CFO is on the company board of directors,
zero otherwise.
% Female Board The percentage of female directors on the company board.
% Female Remu. The percentage of female directors on the remuneration committee.
CFO Ownership The percentage of company shares owned by the CFO.
CFO Tenure The number of years since the CFO was appointed.
Board Size The number of directors on the board of directors.
Insider Ratio The percentage of executive directors on the board.
AC Size The number of directors on the audit committee.
PAFE The percentage of audit committee members who have financial accounting expert,
i,e. the biography states one of the followings: CA/CPA, auditor, controller,
treasurer or finance managers.
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Table 2: Sample industry - separated between female and male CFOs firms.
Industry No. of firms Female CFOs Male CFOs Percentage of female CFOs
Consumer Discretionary 53 4 49 7.55%
Consumer Staples 32 3 29 9.38%
Energy 66 10 56 1.52%
Financials 97 9 88 9.28%
Healthcare 50 2 48 4.00%
Industrials 88 3 85 3.41%
Information Technology 17 0 17 0%
Materials 134 10 124 7.46%
Telecommunications 13 0 13 0%
Utilities 6 0 6 0%
Total 556 41 515 7.37%
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics.
Panel A: CFO Gender and CFO compensation
Pooled sample Female CFOs Male CFOs Diff. in mean/median
N = 556 N = 41 N = 515 Mann-Whitney
Mean Median Std dev Mean Median Std dev Mean Median Std dev t-stat stat
CFO compensation ($)
Salary 470,608 364,299 302,731 317,746 275,229 177,550 482,778 375,000 307,393 -3.39*** 3.45***
Bonus 284,008 100,000 462,893 75,908 14,100 126,564 300,575 114,876 475,800 -3.01*** 3.92**
Total Cash Comp. 895,894 532,455 973,429 474,718 340,536 339,504 929,425 556,413 999,451 -2.90*** 3.75***
Total Non-cash Comp. 259,696 83,426 558,985 91,710 35,458 114,274 273,070 90,058 577,877 -2.01** 2.04**
Total Comp. 1,155,591 665,629 1,1317,673 566,428 383,557 402,132 1,202,495 696,825 1,353,617 -2.99*** 3.55***
Structure of CFO compensation (as % to total compensation)
Prop. Bonus 16.54% 16.84% 15.35% 12.10% 4.03% 11.10% 18.21% 17.72% 15.45% -3.70*** 3.73***
Prop. Salary 57.54% 55.29% 25.63% 65.32% 68.76% 18.85% 56.50% 53.70% 26.00% 2.12** 3.14***
Prop. Cash 84.14% 86.83% 27.29% 86.60% 88.07% 14.32% 83.10% 84.75% 28.07% 1.69* 1.66*
Prop. Non-cash 14.86% 13.18% 27.28% 12.65% 11.94% 14.03% 15.84% 14.25% 15.56% -1.68* 1.65*
Financial characteristics
Sales ($mil) 3,589 505 8,646 991 64 2,314 3,796 559 8,929 -2.01** 3.71***
Leverage 0.47 0.49 0.26 0.38 0.34 0.28 0.48 0.49 0.27 -2.28** 2.18**
M/B Ratio 3.48 2.30 4.46 3.40 1.97 4.29 3.49 2.31 4.48 -0.12 0.90
ROA 3.70% 6.50% 19.36% 0.91% 4.02% 18.38% 3.92% 6.59% 19.43% -0.96 1.58
Stock Returns 7.44% 8.79% 59.73% 4.39% 0.96% 54.23% 7.69% 9.16% 60.18% -0.34 0.30
Governance and CFO characteristics
CFO Female 7.37%
MBA Qual. 20.50% 26.89% 20.00% 1.04
CFO Board 43.08% 31.71% 54.98% -2.76***
% Female Board 6.49% 0% 8.58% 9.73% 11.11% 9.71% 6.36% 0% 8.45% 2.52** 2.24**
%Female Rem. 8.13% 0% 14.14% 6.99% 0% 15.20% 8.22% 0% 14.08% -0.50 0.63
CFO Ownership 0.21% 0.03% 0.64% 0.68% 0.07% 1.52% 0.17% 0.03% 0.50% 4.98*** 1.95*
CFO Tenure (years) 5.26 4.17 3.86 4.02 2.92 3.25 5.36 4.33 3.89 -2.14** 2.39**
Board size 7.08 8.00 2.59 6.32 6.00 1.65 7.92 8.00 2.61 -3.87*** 4.11***
Insider ratio 39.49% 37.50% 15.76% 48.53% 50.00% 21.51% 38.77% 37.50% 15.01% 3.86*** 3.01***
continued on next page
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Panel B: CFO Gender and Earnings Management
Pooled sample Female CFOs Male CFOs Diff. in mean/median
N = 437 N = 31 N = 406 Mann-Whitney
Mean Median Std dev Mean Median Std dev Mean Median Std dev t-stat stat
Earnings management
AM 0.061 0.032 0.097 0.052 0.021 0.049 0.067 0.043 0.099 -0.80 1.94*
RTM 0.244 0.160 0.425 0.186 0.158 0.149 0.249 0.161 0.439 -1.83* 0.21
Financial characteristics
Total Assets ($mil) 7,403 704 21,259 1,267 192 2,404 7,872 827 21,977 -1.67* 2.91***
Prop. Loss Years 0.23 0 0.36 0.40 0.17 0.08 0.21 0 0.35 2.86*** 2.13**
Std dev (Sales/TA) 0.22 0.14 0.52 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.23 0.15 0.54 -0.82 1.07
Std dev (CF/TA) 0.13 0.06 0.27 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.14 0.06 0.28 -1.16 0.96
Governance characteristics
AC Size 3.47 3.00 0.92 3.16 3.00 0.82 3.50 3.00 0.92 -1.97** 1.57
PAFE 0.54 0.50 0.27 0.55 0.67 0.28 0.54 0.50 0.27 0.25 0.28
This table presents summary statistics of firms in our sample for the years 2006 to 2010. Panel A is for CFO compensation and Panel B is for earnings management.
It is reported for the whole sample and also partitioned by gender. All variables are defined in Table 1. Tests for difference in mean and median of each variable in
the two sub-samples are displayed in the table. Bold figures show that there is a significant difference (at the significance level of 10% or better) between the two
sub-samples. *, **, or *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level respectively.
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Table 4: Regression results on CFO compensation (compensation in $’000).
Panel A: Bonus and Non-cash compensation ($’000) - Tobit regression
Bonus Bonus Non-cash Non-cash
Female CFOs -129.98* -170.77* -156.49** -180.66*
[-1.66] [-1.72] [-1.96] [-1.82]
MBA Qualification 182.32*** 188.49*** 153.61** 163.59***
[3.40] [3.54] [2.26] [2.42]
CFO Board -19.83 -12.13 74.55 72.62
[-0.40] [-0.25] [1.19] [1.16]
CFO Ownership -25.25 -22.26 62.58 77.90
[-0.41] [-0.36] [0.91] [1.11]
CFO Tenure (ln) 39.76 39.61 -57.95 -55.65
[1.27] [1.29] [-1.47] [-1.42]
% Female Board 83.12* 674.64**
[1.72] [1.96]
(Female Board)*(Female CFOs) -55.78 -149.39
[-0.26] [-0.56]
% Female Remu. 472.67*** 577.37***
[2.91] [2.78]
(Female Remu.)*(Female CFOs) 72.59 21.83
[0.42] [0.11]
Board Size 28.42*** 28.46*** 87.64*** 86.00***
[2.53] [2.60] [6.68] [6.55]
Insider Ratio -95.92 -39.36 -65.14 -34.51
[-0.54] [-0.22] [-0.30] [-0.16]
Sales (ln) 81.45*** 81.79*** 93.31*** 92.21***
[7.30] [7.54] [7.08] [7.03]
Leverage 82.37 64.90 49.52 41.69
[0.67] [0.53] [0.32] [0.27]
M/B Ratio 2.52 0.70 11.55* 9.46*
[0.49] [0.13] [1.80] [1.67]
ROA -132.79 -114.64 -54.13 -69.58
[-1.00] [-1.09] [-0.35] [-0.45]
Stock Returns 111.97*** 119.13*** 78.11* 85.28*
[2.61] [2.79] [1.69] [1.65]
Include fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Industry & Year)
No. zero observations 144 144 128 128
No. non-zero obs. 412 412 428 428
Total observations 556 556 556 556
continued on next page
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Panel B: Salary and Total compensation ($’000) - OLS regression
Salary Salary Total comp. Total comp.
Female CFOs -91.33** -108.42*** -271.04* -358.35**
[-2.32] [-2.88] [-1.81] [-2.20]
MBA Qualification 12.14 10.86 183.76 208.78
[0.36] [0.32] [0.90] [0.99]
CFO Board 96.60*** 90.98*** 227.65 208.45
[2.97] [2.74] [1.44] [1.28]
CFO Ownership 13.85 52.52 54.16 142.64
[0.57] [1.54] [0.75] [1.45]
CFO Tenure (ln) -22.49 -23.91 -0.98 7.84
[-1.24] [-1.30] [-0.01] [0.08]
% Female Board 300.99* 1,411.77**
[1.85] [2.12]
(Female Board)*(Female CFOs) 59.55 26.56
[0.83] [0.10]
% Female Remu. 195.51* 1,045.58**
[1.87] [2.17]
(Female Remu.)*(Female CFOs) 98.70 251.43
[1.31] [0.88]
Board Size 37.70*** 36.69*** 204.42*** 202.81***
[4.90] [4.57] [4.07] [3.88]
Insider Ratio -162.19 -158.57 -31.38 25.01
[-1.46] [-1.61] [-0.08] [0.06]
Sales (ln) 66.17*** 69.72*** 224.32*** 233.54***
[10.39] [9.98] [5.77] [5.46]
Leverage 7.21 -18.24 70.28 40.10
[0.14] [-0.31] [0.26] [0.13]
M/B Ratio 1.41 1.18 9.16 8.00
[0.44] [0.35] [0.76] [0.61]
ROA -27.79 -39.50 -259.52 -318.45
[-0.42] [-0.54] [-1.01] [-1.16]
Stock Returns -18.61 -18.57 132.35 136.52
[-1.15] [-1.10] [1.59] [1.54]
Include fixed effects? (Industry & Year) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 56.30% 56.15% 57.29% 57.26%
Total observations 556 556 556 556
This table presents the regression results on CFO compensation which is expressed in dollar value ($’000), separately for
Bonus, Salary, Total non-cash Comp. and Total Comp. The sample of 556 observations is for the years 2006 to 2010.
Female CFOs is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CFO is female. % Female Board (or % Female Remu.) is the
proportion of female directors on the board (or on the remuneration committee). (Female Board)*(Female CFOs) (or
(Female Remu.)*(Female CFOs)) is the interaction variable between the variable indicating the presence of female on the
board (or on the remuneration committee) and the Female CFOs variable. MBA Qualification is a binary variable equal
to 1 if the CFO has an MBA degree. CFO Board is a binary variable coded as one if the CFO is on the company board
of directors. CFO Ownership is the percentage of company shares owned by the CFO. CFO Tenure is the number of
years since the CFO was appointed, expressed in natural logarithm. Board Size is the number of directors on the board of
directors. Insider Ratio is the percentage of executive directors on the board. Sales is the gross sales figure after credit and
returns in prior year, expressed in natural logarithm. Leverage is firm financial leverage, calculated as total debt divided by
market value of equity. M/B Ratio is market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. ROA is return on assets,
calculated as earnings before tax divided by total assets. Stock Returns is the unadjusted return on company’s shares
during the year, calculated as the current year share price divided by the previous year share price, expressed in natural
logarithm. Each regression uses the clustered standard errors estimation (Rogers 1993). It also includes industry-specific
and year-specific fixed effects to control for systematic differences in compensation across industries and over time. Figures
in square brackets are t-statistics. Emboldened figures indicate statistical significance at 10% level or better. *, ** or ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level respectively.
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Table 5: Regression results on CFO compensation (log(compensation)).
Panel A: Bonus and Non-cash compensation (log) - OLS regression
Ln(Bonus) Ln(Bonus) Ln(Non-cash) Ln(Non-cash)
Female CFOs -0.46* -0.47* -0.55* -0.43*
[-1.67] [-1.66] [-1.78] [-1.66]
MBA Qualification 0.26*** 0.29* 0.22 0.24
[2.68] [1.82] [1.15] [1.28]
CFO Board 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.02
[0.03] [0.08] [-0.15] [-0.12]
CFO Ownership 0.15 0.08 0.55*** 0.65***
[1.27] [0.29] [2.61] [3.15]
CFO Tenure (ln) 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
[0.18] [0.22] [0.11] [0.15]
% Female Board 0.18 0.57
[0.24] [0.70]
(Female Board)*(Female CFOs) 0.15 -0.87
[0.31] [-0.90]
% Female Remu. 0.29 1.08*
[0.71] [1.92]
(Female Remu.)*(Female CFOs) 0.22 -0.61
[0.41] [-0.98]
Board Size 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.14*** 0.14***
[3.41] [3.25] [3.05] [2.90]
Insider ratio 0.14 0.23 -0.39 -0.34
[0.24] [0.38] [-0.47] [-0.40]
Sales (ln) 0.30*** 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.28***
[9.23] [8.87] [6.48] [6.09]
Leverage 0.18 0.16 -0.03 -0.04
[0.56] [0.50] [-0.07] [-0.08]
M/B Ratio -0.002 -0.001 0.03* 0.03
[-0.11] [-0.06] [1.68] [1.33]
ROA -0.39 -0.50 -1.27 -1.67
[-0.99] [-1.17] [-1.47] [-1.35]
Stock Returns 0.21* 0.21* -0.17 -0.14
[1.73] [1.67] [-0.23] [-1.05]
Include fixed effects? (Industry & Year) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 53.07% 52.64% 32.52% 33.09%
Total observations 412 412 428 428
continued on next page
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Panel B: Salary and Total compensation (log) - OLS regression
Ln(Salary) Ln(Salary) Ln(Total comp.) Ln(Total comp.)
Female CFOs -0.19* -0.23** -0.19 -0.32**
[-1.88] [-2.33] [-1.52] [-1.99]
MBA Qualification 0.08 0.05 0.13* 0.14
[1.09] [0.68] [1.68] [1.51]
CFO Board 0.08 0.10* 0.10 0.09
[0.99] [1.67] [1.07] [0.97]
CFO Ownership 0.04 0.18** 0.17** 0.17*
[0.69] [2.01] [1.97] [1.92]
CFO Tenure (ln) -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01
[-0.24] [-0.88] [-0.18] [-0.15]
% Female Board 0.53* 0.93**
[1.66] [2.12]
(Female Board)*(Female CFOs) 0.26 -0.03
[1.01] [-0.12]
% Female Remu. 0.24 0.65**
[1.22] [2.39]
(Female Remu.)*(Female CFOs) 0.29 0.29
[1.54] [1.11]
Board Size 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.09*** 0.09***
[2.96] [2.73] [4.07] [3.95]
Insider ratio -0.36 -0.42 -0.50 -0.46
[-1.63] [-1.57] [-1.60] [-1.54]
Sales (ln) 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.21*** 0.21***
[10.47] [10.19] [9.78] [10.06]
Leverage 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.06
[0.71] [0.47] [0.37] [0.29]
M/B Ratio -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.001
[-0.10] [-0.07] [0.24] [0.08]
ROA -0.05 -0.08 -0.23 -0.26
[-0.32] [-0.47] [-1.02] [-1.12]
Stock Returns -0.13 -0.11 0.05 0.05
[-1.44] [-1.18] [0.74] [0.81]
Include fixed effects? (Industry & Year) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 59.83% 59.45% 58.15% 58.61%
Total observations 556 556 556 556
This table presents the regression results on CFO compensation which is expressed in natural logarithm, separately
for Bonus, Salary, Total non-cash Comp. and Total Comp. The sample of 556 observations is for the years 2006 to
2010. Female CFOs is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CFO is female. % Female Board (or % Female Remu.) is
the proportion of female directors on the board (or on the remuneration committee). (Female Board)*(Female CFOs)
(or (Female Remu.)*(Female CFOs)) is the interaction variable between the variable indicating the presence of female
on the board (or on the remuneration committee) and the Female CFOs variable. MBA Qualification is a binary
variable equal to 1 if the CFO has an MBA degree. CFO Board is a binary variable coded as one if the CFO is on the
company board of directors. CFO Ownership is the percentage of company shares owned by the CFO. CFO Tenure
is the number of years since the CFO was appointed, expressed in natural logarithm. Board Size is the number of
directors on the board of directors. Insider Ratio is the percentage of executive directors on the board. Sales is the gross
sales figure after credit and returns in prior year, expressed in natural logarithm. Leverage is firm financial leverage,
calculated as total debt divided by market value of equity. M/B Ratio is market value of equity divided by the book
value of equity. ROA is return on assets, calculated as earnings before tax divided by total assets. Stock Returns is
the unadjusted return on company’s shares during the year, calculated as the current year share price divided by the
previous year share price, expressed in natural logarithm. Each regression uses the clustered standard errors estimation
(Rogers 1993). It also includes industry-specific and year-specific fixed effects to control for systematic differences in
compensation across industries and over time. Figures in square brackets are t-statistics. Emboldened figures indicate statis-
tical significance at 10% level or better. *, **, or *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level respectively.
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Table 6: Regression results on CFO compensation structure.
Panel A: Proportion of Bonus/ Non-cash compensation to Total compensation (%) - Tobit regression
Prop. Bonus Prop. Bonus Prop. Non-cash Prop. Non-cash
Female CFOs -5.85** -4.66** -2.18* -2.39*
[-2.06] [-1.98] [-1.65] [-1.68]
MBA Qualification 4.93*** 5.07*** 3.24 3.42*
[2.68] [2.71] [1.57] [1.65]
CFO Board -1.52 -0.53 -1.71 -1.51
[-0.87] [-0.31] [-0.88] [-0.77]
CFO Ownership -0.24 -2.58 0.62 2.84
[-0.10] [-1.09] [0.38] [1.13]
CFO Tenure (ln) -0.51 -0.20 -1.75 -1.52
[-0.47] [-0.18] [-1.43] [-1.27]
% Female Board 1.87 25.12***
[0.21] [2.67]
(Female Board)*(Female CFOs) -0.03 -5.40
[-0.01] [-0.92]
% Female Remu. 2.59 23.51***
[0.49] [4.18]
(Female Remu.)*(Female CFOs) -1.32 -12.01
[-0.21] [-1.61]
Board Size 0.12 28.46*** 1.16** 1.07**
[0.29] [2.60] [2.29] [2.09]
Insider Ratio -4.81 -39.36 -9.91 -9.94
[-0.74] [-0.22] [-1.46] [-1.41]
Sales (ln) 2.60*** 2.28*** 1.62*** 1.36***
[6.23] [6.28] [3.75] [2.99]
Leverage -1.11 1.24 0.62 3.05
[-0.25] [0.31] [0.10] [0.47]
M/B Ratio 0.01 0.06 0.44** 0.40**
[0.06] [0.34] [2.29] [1.98]
ROA 3.22 3.37 -6.82 -69.58
[0.76] [0.85] [-1.31] [-0.45]
Stock Returns 6.09*** 6.03*** 1.39 1.46
[3.72] [3.63] [0.84] [0.85]
Include fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Industry & Year)
No. zero observations 144 144 128 128
No. non-zero obs. 412 412 428 428
Total observations 556 556 556 556
continued on next page
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Panel B: Proportion of Salary/ Cash compensation to Total compensation (%) - OLS regression
Prop. Salary Prop. Salary Prop. Cash Prop. Cash
Female CFOs 6.28** 3.27* 2.32* 2.11*
[2.13] [1.89] [1.65] [1.67]
MBA Qualification -1.03 -1.78 0.26 0.27
[-0.34] [-0.57] [0.07] [0.07]
CFO Board 1.35 1.04 2.48 2.04
[0.68] [0.53] [1.16] [0.96]
CFO Ownership -0.70 -0.72 -1.57 -3.62
[-0.32] [-0.22] [-0.95] [-1.23]
CFO Tenure (ln) 1.67 0.47 2.92* 2.49*
[1.10] [0.35] [1.67] [1.69]
% Female Board 3.66 1.05
[1.19] [0.28]
(Female Board)*(Female CFOs) -5.08 -2.31
[-0.76] [-0.36]
% Female Remu. -19.94 -23.32
[-1.63] [-1.39]
(Female Remu.)*(Female CFOs) 1.67 12.76
[0.30] [1.41]
Board Size -1.06 36.69*** -0.04 0.13
[-1.16] [4.57] [-0.03] [0.10]
Insider Ratio 14.82** -158.57 14.06* 12.22
[1.97] [-1.61] [1.75] [1.62]
Sales (ln) -3.40*** -2.82*** -1.77*** -1.42**
[-5.80] [-4.74] [-2.81] [-2.04]
Leverage 7.61 5.18 8.58 8.46
[1.04] [0.67] [0.99] [0.86]
M/B Ratio -0.20 -0.19 -0.39** -0.35
[-0.92] [-0.76] [-1.99] [-1.56]
ROA 12.16*** 16.24*** 15.56*** 19.06***
[2.67] [2.59] [2.87] [2.86]
Stock Returns -9.81 -9.68 -5.39 -5.81
[-1.56] [-1.37] [-1.47] [-1.44]
Include fixed effects? (Industry & Year) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 18.14% 18.03% 9.29% 9.08%
Total observations 556 556 556 556
This table presents the regression results on CFO compensation structure. The dependent variables are Prop. Bonus
and Prop. Non-cash (in Panel A), Prop. Salary and Prop. Cash (in Panel B) which are calculated as the percentage
of bonus, non-cash compensation, salary or cash compensation to total compensation, respectively. The sample of 556
observations is for the years 2006 to 2010. Female CFOs is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CFO is female. % Female
Board (or % Female Remu.) is the proportion of female directors on the board (or on the remuneration committee).
(Female Board)*(Female CFOs) (or (Female Remu.)*(Female CFOs)) is the interaction variable between the variable
indicating the presence of female on the board (or on the remuneration committee) and the Female CFOs variable. MBA
Qualification is a binary variable equal to 1 if the CFO has an MBA degree. CFO Board is a binary variable coded as
one if the CFO is on the company board of directors. CFO Ownership is the percentage of company shares owned by the
CFO. CFO Tenure is the number of years since the CFO was appointed, expressed in natural logarithm. Board Size is the
number of directors on the board of directors. Insider Ratio is the percentage of executive directors on the board. Sales
is the gross sales figure after credit and returns in prior year, expressed in natural logarithm. Leverage is firm financial
leverage, calculated as total debt divided by market value of equity. M/B Ratio is market value of equity divided by the
book value of equity. ROA is return on assets, calculated as earnings before tax divided by total assets. Stock Returns
is the unadjusted return on company’s shares during the year, calculated as the current year share price divided by the
previous year share price, expressed in natural logarithm. Each regression uses the clustered standard errors estimation
(Rogers 1993). It also includes industry-specific and year-specific fixed effects to control for systematic differences in
compensation across industries and over time. Figures in square brackets are t-statistics. Emboldened figures indicate statis-
tical significance at 10% level or better. *, **, or *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level respectively.
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Table 7: Regression results on earnings management.
AM RTM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female CFOs -0.04* -0.05** -0.08* -0.11**
[-1.72] [-1.97] [-1.74] [-2.48]
CFO Board 0.01 0.001 -0.05 -0.05
[0.61] [0.12] [-1.01] [-0.98]
CFO Ownership 0.03 0.05 0.11*** 0.11**
[1.03] [1.34] [3.25] [2.50]
CFO Tenure (ln) 0.003 0.003 -0.01 -0.003
[0.44] [0.45] [-0.47] [-0.14]
Female Dir. Board -0.02* -0.03
[-1.90] [-0.88]
Female Dir. Remu. -0.01 -0.03
[-0.71] [-0.98]
AC Size 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.001
[0.36] [0.36] [0.07] [-0.06]
PAFE -0.002 0.002 -0.03 -0.04
[-0.08] [0.06] [-0.61] [-0.81]
Total Assets (ln) -0.01** -0.01*** -0.02 -0.02
[-2.34] [-2.93] [-1.17] [-1.44]
Leverage -0.01 -0.002 0.05 -0.003
[-0.21] [-0.08] [0.67] [-0.01]
M/B Ratio 0.001 0.001 0.03 0.03
[1.02] [1.53] [1.23] [1.22]
Prop. Loss Years 0.01 0.002 0.08 0.08
[0.49] [0.10] [1.14] [1.13]
Std dev (Sales/TA) -0.004 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03**
[-0.46] [-0.99] [-1.15] [-2.21]
Std dev (CF/TA) 0.004 -0.02 0.07 0.07
[0.18] [-1.63] [1.32] [1.33]
Include fixed effects? (Industry & Year) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 9.93% 10.53% 18.91% 15.68%
Total observations 437 437 437 437
This table presents the regression results on earnings management. AM is the proxy of accruals management, accrual
estimation errors. RTM is the proxy for real transactions manipulation. Female CFOs is an indicator variable equal to 1 if
the CFO is female. CFO Board is a binary variable coded as one if the CFO is on the company board of directors. CFO
Ownership is the percentage of company shares owned by the CFO. CFO Tenure is the number of years since the CFO
was appointed, expressed in natural logarithm. Female Dir. Board is a dummy variable equal to 1 if there is a presence of
female directors on the board. Female Dir. Remu is a binary variable equal to 1 if there is a presence of female directors
on the remuneration committee. AC Size is the size of audit committee. PAFE is the proportion of directors on the audit
committee who have financial accounting expertise. Total Assets is the company total assets in prior year, expressed in
natural logarithm. Leverage is firm financial leverage, calculated as total debt divided by market value of equity. M/B Ratio
is market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. Prop. Loss Years is the proportion of years that a company
made loss over the last 6 years. Std dev (Sales/TA) (or Std dev (CF/TA)) is the standard deviation of sales (or operating
cash flows) scaled by total assets over the previous 5 years. Each regression uses the clustered standard errors estimation
(Rogers 1993). It also includes industry-specific and year-specific fixed effects to control for systematic differences in
compensation across industries and over time. Figures in square brackets are t-statistics. Emboldened figures indicate statis-
tical significance at 10% level or better. *, **, or *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level respectively.
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